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INTRODUCTION 
Appellant Robert Magness in his opening Brief of October 29, 2015 raised 
three specific issues on appeal: (I) the trial court erred in failing to make sufficient 
findings of fact to address the undisputed evidence proffered by Defendant that 
was in conflict with the statements of the prosecutor ; (2) the prosecutorial 
misconduct of the deputy district attorney in misrepresenting the desires of the 
complainant violated Defendant's due process rights and caused him to forfeit his 
right to a preliminary hearing and trial by jury; and (3) alternatively, Defendant is 
entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under Section 77-13-6(2)(A) U.C.A. since the 
record shows that the plea was not knowingly or voluntarily made. (Appellant's 
Brief, p. i). 
The State, for whatever reason, has chosen to consolidate its arguments 
solely as to the third issue raised by Appellant thereby causing defendant Magness 
and this Court to pick and choose portions of the State's Brief that may be 
pertinent to the first two issues. In order to maintain continuity, defendant 
Magness will address the original three issues as outlined in his opening Brief and 
will reply to the State's arguments whenever they can be discerned. 
It should be emphasized, once again, however, that all of the relevant factual 
statements in this appeal are contained solely in the Affidavits submitted by the 
defendant and by the dialogue during the plea agreement proceeding. See all of the 
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affidavits in Addendum C of the State's Brief). In fact, the very attorney-- Tad 
May-- who prosecuted this case from the beginning of the alleged assault was 
unexplainably reassigned from this matter on the very date that the lower court was 
considering whether the plea agreement should be vacated; thus preventing even 
Mr. May from being able to explain his prior conduct. 
Defendant submits that without any rebuttal evidence or affidavits submitted 
by the State, it must be assumed as a matter of law that the State had nothing in 
opposition to offer to contradict the version of facts submitted by Defendant and 
therefore, this Court must assume all factual statements relating to these issues are 
true as recited by Defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE 
SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FACT TO ADDRESS 
THE UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE PROFFERED BY 
DEFENDANT. 
The State has made no direct attack upon Defendant's argument that a 
remand for factual findings or an evidentiary hearing should be made as to the 
direct contradictions between the telephonic statements of the victim versus the in ~ 
court statement made by prosecutor Tad May. The State attempts to minimize the 
telephone transcript that was proffered to the lower court on the basis that "the 
prosecutor merely misunderstood her priorities when he spoke with her at intake." 
2 
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(State's Brief, p. 22). The State makes no attempt to discuss the subsequent events 
after the "intake" that occurred months later at the scheduled preliminary hearing. 
The conflict of facts is striking: the Affidavits of Mr. Long and Mr. Magness 
unequivocally stated that at the time of the preliminary hearing Mr. May 
represented to defense counsel and Defendant that the victim did not seek prison 
time for the defendant. The lower court adopted this position in her ruling by 
noting that at the time he spoke with the victim she was not seeking prison time. 
(Ruling and Order, p. 2). On the other hand, the victim in her statement to 
defendant's investigator emphatically stated that she always sought prison time and 
had informed the prosecutor that from the moment of the sexual event she wanted 
to see Defendant go to prison and also to be listed as a sex offender. Obviously, 
either Mr. May was misrepresenting what he had been told by the victim or the 
victim was misrepresenting what she had told Mr. May. In either case, however, a 
material conflict clearly exists which requires a factual hearing and a ruling as to 
the truthfulness of one side or the other since it relates to both prosecutorial 
misconduct and the setting aside of the guilty plea. 
As noted in the Defendant's opening Brief, appellate law requires that the 
lower court must assess the credibility of conflicting evidence and make detailed 
findings as to all relevant facts pursuant to Rule 12( c) of the Utah Rules of 
3 
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Criminal Procedure. In spite of such a request, the lower court refused to do so. 
(Defendant's Brief p.21). 
However, the issue of a remand for further factual findings or an evidentiary 
hearing becomes only relevant if this Court rejects Defendant's argument as to 
prosecutorial misconduct contained in Point II and/or rejects Defendant's Point III 
that the plea was not made voluntarily or knowingly in light of the 
misrepresentation of the victim's state of mind. If either of these issues is resolved 
in Defendant's favor then this remand request by Defendant becomes moot. 
POINT II 
THE PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT OF THE DEPUTY 
DISTRICT ATTORNEY MISREPRESENTING THE DESIRES 
OF THE COMPLAINANT VIOLATED DEFENDANT'S DUE 
PROCESS RIGHTS AND CAUSED HIM TO FOREGO HIS 
RIGHT TO PRELIMINARY HEARING AND TRIAL BY JURY. 
Defendant in his opening Brief spent six pages extensively arguing that the 
conduct of the deputy district attorney Tad May during the preliminary hearing 
date of June 6, 2013 constituted actionable misconduct by misrepresenting the 
attitude and desires of the complaining witness. (Defendant's Brief pp. 22-27) The 
State in its Brief makes no reference whatsoever to this event. The Affidavits of 
Mr. Long and Mr. Magness clearly indicate that deputy district attorney Tad May 
was so upbeat in his assessment as to the victim's attitude towards leniency that 
they willingly gave up a scheduled preliminary hearing examination. In other 
4 
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words, the statements of Mr. May at this proceeding planted the seeds that later 
grew and blossomed a year later in accepting the plea agreement. 
The State has offered no contrary evidence or testimony to contradict the 
vl claim that Mr. May informed both the defendant and Mr. Long that the victim did 
not seek prison incarceration for the defendant and that a favorable plea agreement 
could probably be reached in the future based upon her attitude. The State has 
made no attempt to refute the legal authorities cited by Defendant that such 
misrepresentation violates the duty of a prosecutor to maintain a fair playing field 
in order to allow defendants to make knowledgeable decisions during the entire 
course of a legal prosecution. 
Moreover, the State has failed in its briefing requirements to answer the 
contention raised by Defendant in his opening Brief. This Court has held that "an 
issue is inadequately briefed when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as 
to shift the burden of research and arguments to the reviewing court." State v. 
Sloan, 2003 UT App. Sec. 170, ,I 13, 72 P.3d 138 (Utah App. 2003). Moreover, 
the argument portion of a brief must contain citations to the record as required by 
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. "A party may not rely upon this 
Court to make his arguments for him." Id. 
Similarly, this Court in Utah v. Randy J. Montoya, 837 P.2d 145 (Utah 
~ 
1997) stated the following: 
5 
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Under Rule 24(b ), an appellee must provide an argument "containing 
the contentions and reasons of the [ appellee] with respect to the issues 
presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on. When an appellee fails to comply with this rule, we will decline to 
address the issue because the "reviewing court is entitled to have the issue 
clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository 
in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research." State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450 (Utah 1988). This Court has 
routinely failed to consider arguments which are not adequately briefed on 
appeal. (quoting State v.Yates, 834 P.2d 599 (Utah App. 1992). 
Indeed, appellate courts while applying a high standard of briefing on an 
appellant under Rule 24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also require 
an equal burden on an appellee under Rule 24(b ). In numerous instances appellees 
have voided their right to argue against an appellant for inadequate briefing. See, 
Angel Investors, 2009 UT 40, ~~ 34-36; Advanced Restoration v. Priskos, 126 P.3d ~ 
786 (Utah App. 2005); State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24 (Utah 2015). 
Defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct permeates the entire 
proceeding and is not focused solely upon the change of plea hearing as contained 
in the third issue of Defendant's Brief. Here, the defense was misled on June 6, 
2013 by the misrepresentation of district attorney Tad May that the complaining 
witness did not seek prison and was so optimistic about her attitude that the long-
experienced defense attorney Larry Long decided to waive the very critical 
preliminary hearing that was already prepared for cross examination of the 
complaining witness and her girlfriend. Obviously the statements made by Mr. 
6 
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May were very persuasive and created a strong impression that the complaining 
vJJ witness was not vindictive over an incident that occurred while a drunken party 
was being held. 
On January 5, 2015 the defense was ready to file a number of motions that 
had been postponed for over a year due to various circumstances. It was on this 
occasion that Mr. May once again approached the defense and offered the plea 
agreement again based upon his assertion that the complaining witness did not seek 
a prison incarceration. Thus, it was not only the isolated hearing of January 20} 5 
focused upon by the State in its Brief, but it is also the prior events which occurred 
in 2013 that convinced two experienced defense attorneys to enter into a plea 
agreement based upon a high probability that the complaining witness was not 
vindictive and would not ask for a prison term. 
The State in its Brief has completely failed to address the separate issue of 
prosecutorial misconduct which is separate and apart from the issue relating to the 
withdrawal of the guilty plea. The failure to offer any contradicting evidence or to 
even have the deputy district attorney Tad May present during the critical 2015 
hearing for questioning by the trial court and examination by defense counsel, 
should cause this Court to default the State in any argument against the contentions 
raised by Defendant. This Court should grant Defendant's motion to reinstate the 
criminal proceeding with the right of a preliminary hearing and the right to 
7 
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reinstate all of the prior motions and procedures that were terminated by the plea 
agreement. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO WITHDRAW HIS 
GUILTY PLEA UNDER SECTION 77-13-6(2)(A) U.C.A. 
SINCE THE RECORD SHOWS THAT THE PLEA WAS 
NOT KNOWINGLY OR VOLUNT ARJL Y MADE. 
The crux of the State's argument in attempting to refute this point 
(Apppellee's Brief, pp. 13-24) is that it was not important what the victim 
previously had told the prosecutor as to her desire for the defendant to go to prison 
since the only crucial time period of her intent was at the future time of sentencing. 
Thus, the State's argument goes that since the prosecutor did not really know what 
the victim would desire at the time of sentencing, the defendant made the plea 
voluntarily and knowingly because he was aware that she could always 
recommend a prison sentence at the critical time of sentencing. 
This argument has two fatal flaws. First, the State has mischaracterized the 
statements of the prosecutor at the time of the plea agreement. The State 
proclaims: 
At the plea hearing the prosecutor expressly stated that his 
recommendation for no prison was wholly contingent on MC' s wishes at 
sentencing because he had not talked to her since the initial intake and he 
was uncertain what her wishes would be by that time. See R. 364: 3,A. 
Indeed the condition itself made it clear that the prosecutor was unsure what 
MC's sentencing position was and that he was making no promises about 
what it would by the time of sentencing. (Appellee' s Brief, p. 16-1 7). 
8 
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In reality, Mr. May stated to the Court; 
When we met initially during the intake, her very first impression of 
the case was, actually, she was not seeking prison at the time and was fairly 
amenable to resolving the case .... Our recommendation is simply that we 
would honor the victim's wishes. (Tr. Jan. 5, p. 4). 
Thus, the record shows that unlike the representation made by the State, the 
prosecutor did not inform the court that he had no idea as to what the victim would 
be seeking at the time of the sentencing. Rather he affirmatively stated that she did 
not seek prison incarceration from his prior interaction with her. 
Also, he did not inform the court as to his interaction with the victim at the time of 
the preliminary hearing in 2013. 
Second, the State notes that contract principles may be useful in assessing 
whether a guilty plea was knowingly made. (Appellate Brief, pp. 15-16). 
Defendant concurs with this analysis. A similar example to the instant case will 
suffice to illustrate why this plea should be withdrawn. Presidential candidate 
Ricky Ricardo enters into a written contract with former president Fred Murtz that 
President Murtz will endorse candidate Ricardo for $500,000 one month prior to 
the party convention unless candidate Ricardo is indicted by the IRS for tax fraud. 
The $500,000 consideration is paid and is nonrefundable. Five weeks before the 
convention the IRS files an indictment against candidate Ricardo and President 
Murtz therefore does not endorse him. This scenario would be similar to the 
9 
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arguments made by the State in its Brief that since neither party knew what was 
going to occur in the future, each took their chance in making their contract and 
could not therefore complain as to the future outcome. 
Now, assume instead that President Murtz had inside information from his 
beloved wife IRS Commissioner Ethel Murtz that candidate Ricardo was about to 
be indicted by the IRS within the next few months prior to the convention. In other 
words, President Murtz knew that his promise for an endorsement was completely 
illusionary and that he would be able to keep the $500,000 without an 
endorsement. Under this scenario the fact that a future event was about to occur is 
immaterial and the focus instead is what the parties knew at the time that the deal 
was made. 
The arguments made by the State, therefore, fail to recognize that the 
uncontroverted evidence offered by the defendant --with no opposing affidavits or 
testimony from any witnesses or prosecutor of the state-- clearly shows that the 
intention of the victim from the very moment of the event was to imprison the 
defendant. All of the cases previously cited by Defendant in his opening Brief 
support the legal principle that when making plea agreements all parties must be 
dealing with the same information and that no misleading or false relevant 
information can be used by the State to induce a guilty plea. (Defendant's Brief 
pp.28-30). 
10 
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Would candidate Ricky Ricardo have paid the $500,000 to former President 
xiP Murtz if he had been informed by Murtz that the IRS was intending to indict him 
within a few months? Certainly not. Neither would this defendant have plead 
guilty and waived all of his constitutional rights to a jury trial had he been 
informed that the victim from the time of the incident always emphatically wanted 
him to be imprisoned. 
In summary, therefore, this case does not involve whether the victim could 
change her mind at the time of sentencing as argued by the State-a risk clearly 
assumed by the defendant-but instead involves a misrepresentation of a material 
fact at the time of the plea agreement which induced the plea agreement to occur in 
the first place. 
For this reason, therefore, and for the reasons stated in the opening Brief of 
Defendant this plea agreement should be set aside so that a proper trial can take 
place. 
CONCLUSION 
The failure of the State to respond in a logical and sequential manner 
requires a somewhat unusual evaluation of this case. First, if this Court adopts the 
unopposed arguments made by Defendant as to prosecutorial misconduct contained 
in Point II of his opening Brief, this matter should be remanded and allowed to 
11 
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proceed at the preliminary hearing stage with all other motions and defenses 
reinstated. In such a case, Points I and III become irrelevant. 
If this Court decides Point II adversely to Defendant ( even though the State 
has filed no opposition to it), then the Points I and Points III become relevant. If 
this Court finds that the defendant did not make a knowing and voluntary plea as 
argued in Point III of Defendant's Brief, then the plea should be vacated and the 
matter should proceed to trial. In such a case, Point I relating to the remand for 
findings is again immaterial and becomes moot. 
Finally, if this Court rejects both Point II relating to prosecutorial 
misconduct and Point III relating to the knowing and voluntary plea, then Point I 
becomes relevant since the lower court must enter findings to resolve the 
inconsistency of the representations made by district attorney Tad May to the 
Court versus the statements made by the victim to the defendant's investigator 
Defendant requests that this Court carefully examine the contentions of this 
Defendant in spite of the inarticulate opposition filed by the State. 
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I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of 
Appellant to Marion Decker, Assistant Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, 6th 
Floor, P. 0. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 this 29th day of 
~ February, 2016. 
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